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Abstract 
The article analyzes the commonalities and differences of counterterrorism (CT) practices 
applied by governments in France and Germany and their effects on the local ground. 
Altogether, there has been a qualitative difference of CT responses. Paris has launched more 
extensive measures than Berlin. Regardless of the differences, the policies of both 
governments lack attention towards the unintended effects of these specific measures. For 
instance, the concern raised by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) 
about the prolongation of the state of emergency in France is one starting point of analysis. AI 
accused the French authorities of abetting home-grown radicalization as a result of the 
discriminate repression in marginalized suburbs of Paris. The paper’s argument is twofold: 
First, decision-makers in Paris and Berlin respond to terrorist threats in a one-sided and linear 
way. Second, they disregard that the very CT measures are likely to fuel radicalization. In this 
light, polarization and stigmatization breed radicalization. Based on this discussion, policy 
recommendations will be presented. Amongst other things, these recommendations include a 
more symmetric integration of local actors in the overall de-radicalization effort. This refers 
to the content and tone of public debates as well as to the equal treatment of prison imams. 
Keywords: Counterterrorism; Germany, France; Deradicalization; Countering Violent 
Extremism 
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Introduction2 
With the terrorist attack in Berlin in December 2016, the question of adequate 
counterterrorism (CT) responses has gained momentum in the German public debate. 
Beforehand, the German government had shown reservation when it came to CT compared to 
the French government. Externally, German military support was expanded to the coalition 
against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levante (ISIL). The same held true for an intensified 
German engagement in Mali at the request of France (Giegerich and Terhalle 2016; Peifer 
2016). Domestically, the policy focus was on increased surveillance techniques (e.g. data 
preservation, closed-circuit television (CCTV), electronic tags etc.) (Bug and Bukow 2016; 
Dearden 2017). Altogether, there has been a qualitative difference of the CT responses in 
Germany compared to the gradual erosion of liberty rights in France under the state of 
emergency: Paris has launched more extensive measures than Berlin. Regardless of the 
differences, the policies initiated by both governments lack attention towards the unintended 
effects of these specific measures. 
The concern raised by Amnesty International (AI) or Human Rights Watch (HRW) about the 
prolongation of the state of emergency in France is one starting point of analysis in this 
regard. The human rights organizations accused the French authorities of abetting home-
grown radicalization as a result of the discriminate repression in marginalized suburbs of Paris 
(Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016). Similar critique had been issued 
against French authorities in the context of violent riots in 2005 (Chrisafis 2015; Koff and 
Duprez 2009). In this light, the paper’s argument is twofold: First, decision-makers in Paris 
and Berlin respond to terrorist threats in an one-sided and linear way. Second, they disregard 
that the very CT measures are likely to fuel radicalization. The latter holds particularly true 
considering the polarizing campaigns for the presidential and parliamentary elections in the 
Netherlands, France, and Germany in 2017. 
This policy paper will shed light on the unintended effects of CT measures in France and 
Germany. The argument goes that polarization and stigmatization breed radicalization. Based 
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on this discussion, policy recommendations will be presented. Amongst other things, these 
recommendations include a more symmetric integration of local actors in the overall de-
radicalization effort. This refers to the content and tone of public debates as well as the equal 
treatment of prison imams. 
Counterterrorism in France and Germany 
Despite a huge variety of definitions of what terrorism and/or counterterrorism are meant to 
look like, there is some consensus on what states do to stop, deter, or prevent such threats 
(Sandler 2015; Shanahan 2016; Rineheart 2010; Boyle 2010). Lindahl (2016) brings together 
four CT-dimensions that illustrate the commonalities and differences between Paris and 
Berlin. This overview will help to understand the later analysis of unintended effects. 
Table 1: CT measures compared 
 France Germany 
Use of force Air strikes 
Military supplies and training 
Assistance to air strikes  
Military supplies and training 
Intelligence 
and 
policing 
Improved interagency cooperation 
Increase of personnel strength 
Improved interagency cooperation 
Increase of personnel strength 
Homeland 
security 
State of emergency 
Increased surveillance 
Increased surveillance 
Conciliation 
and 
dialogue 
Prison reforms Community-based de-radicalization 
Source: Own illustration based on Lindahl 2016; Hellmuth 2015; Sarma 2016. 
For decades, French CT policies have been primarily based on repression and prosecution: 
“(…) [Until] 2014 France did not view Jihadi radicalization as an issue that ought to be 
tackled separately and by means of also soft counterradicalization measures (Hellmuth 2015, 
986).” This operational imbalance proved true after the attacks in January and November 
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2015. French authorities quickly responded with declaring states of emergency, while 
intensifying aerial military engagement and training against ISIL on Iraqi and Syrian territory 
(Lequesne 2016). Berlin’s response was different as each terrorist incident abroad (e.g. Paris, 
Brussels) sparked public debate over increased surveillance. Basically, data preservation and 
CCTV were on top of that agenda. After Anis Amri’s attack in December 2016, the discussion 
went further capitalizing on the need for electronic tags against potential terrorists (Huggler 
2017). Given Berlin’s limited external engagement against ISIL (i.e. assistance and supplies), 
policies and discussions primarily focused on homeland security. For the sake of the 
comparative framework, the following analysis will exclusively look into the domestic 
policies and their intended effects and unintended effects in France and Germany. 
What Lindahl (2016) coins “conciliation and dialogue” can be applied to measures of 
countering violent extremism (CVE). In the present research context, CVE is equivalent to de-
radicalization: “[A] process of individual or collective cognitive change from criminal, radical 
or extremist identities to a non-criminal or moderate psychological state (Koehler 2015a, 121-
122).” There is some consensus in academia on the need for differentiating ‘de-radicalization’ 
(i.e. focus on extremist beliefs and ideas) from ‘disengagement’ (i.e. focus on behavioral role 
change only) (Neumann 2013; Horgan 2009; Borum 2011). Still, such a theoretical 
differentiation comes with challenges with regard to real life experiences as “(…) not all 
violent extremists hold strong, extreme beliefs, and not all extreme ideas lead to violent 
behavior (Hellmuth 2015, 986-987)”. Despite that consensus, however, similar to terrorism 
research there is a huge variety of measures and objectives that have been advocated for de-
radicalization. These range from amnesty, counselling, or dialogue to reconciliation and 
reintegration. While the concept and use of de-radicalization measures is not new from an 
academic’s or practitioner’s perspective, the strategic relevance to CT still is. It is therefore 
not surprising that many CVE studies have dealt with de-radicalization programs from a 
practitioner’s point of view (Dechesne 2011, 2; Koehler 2015a, 121-122). According to the 
UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), states have applied two kind of 
de-radicalization efforts that resemble the aforementioned distinction: individual ideological 
de-radicalization, using psychological and  religious  counselling  to  lead to  a  change  of  
mind, and collective de-radicalization, using political negotiations to obtain a type of change 
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of behavior (UN/CTITF 2008, 5). Furthermore, there have been nine types of national 
programs and foci: prison programs, education, inter-cultural dialogues, economic and social 
inequality, global programs, the internet, legislation reforms, information campaigns, training 
and qualification of local agencies (UN/CTITF 2008, 6). In sum, it is striking that despite the 
huge amount of CT and CVE studies in the aftermath of 9/11, research on de-radicalization 
and rehabilitation programs is still in its infancy (Fink and Hearne 2008, 1). 
With homegrown terrorist perpetrators committing attacks in Paris, Nice, Brussels, and Berlin 
during the last two years, policymakers and researchers in the West have increasingly 
acknowledged the strategic link between CVE and CT (El-Said 2015; Cherney 2016; Lake 
2002; Brimley 2006). Indeed, similar to CT research CVE literature has focused on policy-
oriented strategies that aim to respond to or prevent violence. Less attention has been paid to 
the questions of how CVE is constituted and how it emerges in a variety of ways. There are 
four research interests where scholars have linked CVE and CT in particular (Nasser-Eddine 
et al. 2011, 16-18). First, shaped by post-9/11 discourses and policies the dominant frame for 
understanding violent extremism has been that of (transnational) Islamist networks. This 
singular attention towards extremist Islam has been criticized by scholars for excluding the 
analysis of non-Islam related forms such as right- or left-wing extremism (Kundnani 2009, 
40). Second, the focus on transnational networks has positioned violent extremism and 
terrorism as a global phenomenon. In light of the recent terrorist attacks in France, Belgium, 
and Germany the call for better transnational cooperation and multilateral solutions is an 
ongoing feature in the literature (Renard 2016; Guild and Geyer 2016; Pollard 2007, 237; 
Crelinsten 2007, 212). Third, closely related to the call for transnational cooperation, the 
literature has emphasized collaborative and multi-disciplinary approaches through 
partnerships within and between governments, non-government organizations, and civil 
society. This is in line with the aforementioned CVE literature that stresses the benefits of 
local and decentralized de-radicalization programs. Incorporating private non-state actors has 
been discussed as key tenet in this regard. Fourth, a comprehensive CVE/CT approach calls 
for a multifaceted toolkit that counters extremism based on reactive/short-term (e.g. policing) 
and preventive/long-term (e.g. capacity building) measures (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011, 18; 
Brimley 2006). 
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De-radicalization programs have been launched in France and Germany in spite of homeland 
security issues being primarily discussed under the (more visible) rubric of state of emergency 
measures and/or increased surveillance (see table 2). Similar to CT there has been a 
qualitative difference with regard to CVE, both in terms of timing and scope. While Paris 
started to introduce CVE as a first time ever after the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 2015, there has 
been a longer tradition of countering (right-wing) extremism in Germany since the early 
1990s (Koehler 2013, 2015a). As a consequence, Berlin started the first wide-reaching CVE 
policies directed against the extreme right (Wagner 2013). There are two non-state-organized 
programs that have been particularly heralded in the literature: EXIT-Germany and HAYAT. 
The former counsels highly radicalized individuals who want to leave the extreme right-wing 
scene. The latter is a family counselling program for the relatives of Jihadists and Foreign 
Fighters (Koehler 2015b, 137-139). In a comparative perspective, France has applied a very 
centralized and security-oriented CVE approach. This is in contrast to Germany that is best 
described as following a diverse and decentralized model. Moreover, the scope and number of 
programs in Germany is significantly greater. The table below illustrates the recent CVE 
agendas in both countries. 
Table 2: State-led CVE measures  
France (since 2015) Germany (since 1992) 
De-radicalization wings in prisons Political education (national and subnational) 
De-radicalization centers Funding of civil society engagement 
Intelligence surveillance of jihadist 
webpages 
Training of partner institutions 
Family support hotline Extremism research 
Source: Own illustration based on Koehler 2016; Lützinger, Gruber, and Kemmesis 2016. 
Practitioners (and scholars) hope for effects of CVE measures that CT policies can benefit 
from: First, every individual leaving radical milieus is likely to reduce the manpower of 
radical groups. This in turn prevents that person from radicalizing further. Second, such an 
individual pullout can have a weakening effect on the radical milieu. Third, regardless of 
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success the measures can yield relevant empirical basis and knowledge for further improving 
the CVE toolkit. Fourth, de-radicalization measures might also yield valuable intelligence of 
radical groups (Koehler 2015a, 134-135). According to these desired effects, the German de-
radicalization efforts have been heralded in the literature (Butt and Tuck 2014; Koehler 
2015b, 133-134). The situation in France has been quite the opposite. A cross-party senate 
committee criticized the CVE measures since 2015 as a “total fiasco” and concluded that 
there was need for a complete overhaul of the very measures (Samuel 2017; McAuley 2017). 
For instance, the only de-radicalization center currently running and fully staffed is in fact 
empty, while twelve other centers slated to be set up have not been opened yet. The 
committee also found that many local associations supposed to help families deal with 
radicalized members lacked the expertise and often signed up simply to obtain public funding. 
One previously heralded program to reintegrate radicalized inmates had to be scrapped after a 
prisoner duped the authorities into believing that he had reformed before seeking to murder 
guards (Samuel 2017; McAuley 2017).  
These shortcomings are certainly proof of CVE ineffectiveness. However, such palpable 
observations are not the rule. The theoretical differentiation between cognitive and behavioral 
radicalization has shed light on the difficulty to definitely know whether an individual has 
begun to refrain from radical thoughts or not. CT research faces similar challenges in 
analyzing the causal link between a specific measure and its specific outcome. When talking 
about counterterrorism effectiveness (CTE), there are two issues worth to be reminded of: On 
the one hand, there is a blatant gap between the resources that are being spent by states for CT 
and the academic knowledge about the “success” of the precise measure. On the other hand, 
the little scholars’ knowledge about CT effectiveness is highly disputed in the literature. As to 
the first, estimates for the United States suggest that administrations have spent more than one 
trillion US dollars for measures related to the fight against terrorism between 2001 and 2011 
(Mueller and Stewart 2012, 103). Given this, an effectiveness assessment appears necessary. 
However, according to Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley (2006), out of 20.000 studies on 
terrorism, only seven dealt with the effectiveness of CT policies: “There has been a 
proliferation of anti-terrorism programs and policies as well as massive increases in 
expenditures toward combating terrorism. Yet, we currently know almost nothing about the 
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effectiveness of any of these programs (Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006, 510).” Moreover, 
those seven CT studies contradict with each other in respect to the measurement of success. 
For instance, various indicators are used and weighed differently. Even more controversially, 
there is a case selection bias on CT policies by governments in the US, UK, and Israel. On top 
of that, critics stressed the so-called “attribution problem” basically referring to the 
uncertainty whether a CT policy or something else led to the specific outcome such as less 
terrorism (Van Um and Pisoiu 2015, 233-234). In the light of this academic lack of consensus 
on CTE, it does not come as surprise that the question of unintended effects went entirely 
under the radar. 
The chimera of success 
Following the heads of state and the ministers of the interior both in France and Germany, it 
seems that the CT policies which were launched as response to terrorist attacks and future 
threats worked out well (Dworkin 2016; Daniels 2017). The case of Germany is more obvious 
in this regard. Except for the 2011 Arid Uka attack at the Frankfurt Airport where two US 
soldiers were killed, the December 2016 incident in Berlin constituted the first jihadist 
terrorist attack on German soil after 9/11 (Hemmingby and Bjørgo 2016; Nesser 2014). In 
contrast, major incidents in Paris in November 2015 as well as in Nice in July 2016 were not 
prevented despite the expanding of CT measures by the Hollande government. 
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Graph 1: Terrorist casualties after 9/11 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Conflict Barometer 2001-2016. 
Explaining the variance between the number and scope of terrorist attacks in Germany and 
France is difficult without relying on counterfactual analysis and, therefore, is strongly relying 
on speculation. For instance, some explain the deviance based on the level of external 
engagement, the asylum policies, or socio-ethnic grievances (Daniels 2017; The Economist 
2016). Regardless of the variety of (competing) explanations, when it comes to homeland 
security EU member states have come to believe in the effectiveness of technology and 
surveillance as a tool for crucial information gathering. The more security services know the 
more likely potential terrorists can be apprehended beforehand. This rationale has been the 
major argument brought forward by administrations in favor of more sweeping surveillance 
(Stutzer and Zehnder 2013; Clarke 2015). However, while the call for more personal data has 
been voiced very loudly throughout European metropoles during the last two years, the 
usefulness has only been questioned seldom. This is striking given the apparent futility of 
surveillance and data preservation in preventing terrorist attacks on European soil. Between 
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2014 and 2016 there have been eight deadly jihadist terrorist attacks in the European Union 
(EU): those attacks were perpetrated at a Jewish museum in Brussels, at Charlie Hebdo and a 
supermarket in Paris, at a Synagogue in Copenhagen, at the Bataclan and surroundings in 
Paris, at the airport and a metro station in Brussels, at a police officer’s home in Paris, at a 
Bastille Days’ celebration in Nice, and at a Christmas market in Berlin. 20 terrorists were 
involved in these eight attacks. 19 were known by the authorities, 15 were on terrorist lists of 
at least one EU member state, 15 were classified as likely to resort to violence, 15 were 
known to have direct contact to radical Islamists, 13 had travelled to ISIL in Iraq, Syria, or 
Yemen, twelve were previously convicted, and eight had been wanted by search warrant for 
years (Lobo 2016; Lutz and Leubecher 2016; Kewitz 2017). In other words, authorities had 
plenty information on the perpetrators. Nevertheless, this data did not help them in preventing 
the attacks. There is no guarantee that even more data would yield better results. 
The question of proportionality is also raised when analyzing the outcome of the state of 
emergency in France. According to the Parliamentary Commission in charge of overseeing 
the application of the state of emergency, since November 2015 law enforcement officials 
have relied on the state of emergency to conduct 4,292 warrantless raids, 612 house arrests, 
and 1,657 identity and vehicle control stops (Breeden 2016; Vinocur 2016). These measures 
resulted in 61 terrorism-related criminal investigations, including only 20 under France’s 
broadly defined offense of “criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking”. The 
other 41 cases were filed with lesser offenses such as glorifying terrorism (Amnesty 
International 2016). In other words, the number of judicial procedures enacted as a 
consequence of the state of emergency prerogatives is small in comparison with regular 
judicial procedures. 
These two anecdotes question the effectiveness of the homeland security-related measures 
that have been launched by administrations in Berlin and Paris. Apparently, the number of 
apprehended terrorists and/or prevented attacks is low compared to the huge resources 
invested and the erosion of civil liberties hazarded in the process. Particularly the latter 
aspects point to the often ignored question of unintended effects of CT in France and 
Germany. 
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Unintended effects 
Early post-9/11 CT policies such as in Spain (2004) or in the United Kingdom (2005) were 
launched in a different public environment compared to the situation in 2017. Back then, 
terrorism was perceived as an external threat first (Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Marcuse 2006). 
Huntington’s (1996) “clash of civilizations” and its ambivalent implications slowly became 
mainstream pop culture along with rising Islamophobia (Saeed 2007; Bottici and Challand 
2006). However, at that time the rift between the so-called West on the one hand and the 
Muslim world on the other was not as wide as it is in 2017. What changed were crucial global 
developments beginning with the 2008 financial crisis, the Arab Spring in 2011, the rise of 
ISIL in 2014, and the European refugee crisis peaking in 2015. While the financial crisis 
brought domestic socioeconomic inequality back on top of political agendas, failed 
revolutions in the Middle East and the emergence of ISIL consolidated Islamophobia in the 
West. In light of these events, the increasing public resistance against refugees migrating to 
Europe did not come as a surprise. In particular, commingling the terrorism debate with the 
refugee debate has made Islamophobia socially respectable and allowed right-wing populism 
to enter national parliaments (Zunes 2017; Nail 2016) – regardless of official statistics 
disproving a causal relationship between terrorism and/or crime on the one hand and refugee 
status on the other (Morgan and Poynting 2016; Žižek 2016). In sum, the 2008 fueled social 
polarization of societies in European countries has been added yet another polarization layer 
after the terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016 which has been defined by liberalism versus anti-
Islamism. Thus, launching homeland security-related CT measures in the early 2000s had a 
different societal impact and resonance than in 2017. 
Major concern against increased surveillance and the (prolongation of a) state of emergency 
deals with the erosion of civil liberties (Neocleous 2007; O’Brien 2016). While these risks 
certainly need to be taken seriously, they distract from the risks of further radicalization. The 
French and German contexts very well illustrate the dynamics. Human rights organizations 
such as AI and HRW have criticized French authorities for carrying out abusive and 
discriminatory raids and house arrests against Muslims under its sweeping state of emergency 
law. Apparently, the measures created economic hardship and stigmatization of those targeted 
(Human Rights Watch 2016). Endowed with very broad powers (e.g. house arrest, warrantless 
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searches, prohibition of meetings etc.), the state of emergency has been criticized for “(…) 
[imposing] excessive and disproportionate restrictions on fundamental freedoms” (Human 
Rights Watch 2016). In particular, given the vague language of the provisions there is too 
much room left for abuse. For instance, house arrests are applicable to anyone suspected of 
posing a threat to public security. Moreover, warrantless searches can be conducted at any 
place suspected to be frequented by an individual posing such a threat (Boutin and Paulussen 
2016, 2). Indeed, according to HRW, house arrests have been mandated on the basis of 
sometimes inaccurate intelligence notes, thus raising the concern that they are being decided 
on arbitrary basis. AI and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) criticized 
the use of state of emergency powers against events and/or individuals that lack any 
connection with the terrorist threat that had led to the declaration of the state of emergency in 
the first place (Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016). For instance, 
ecological activists had been put under arrest during the UN Climate Change Conference 
(COP21) in December 2015 and protesters were prevented from attending demonstrations 
against a labor law reform in May 2016 (Boutin and Paulussen 2016, 2). 
Most problematic concerning CT is the discriminatory interpretation by the authorities. The 
vast majority of people placed under house arrest and whose homes were raided are Muslims 
and of North African descent. According to HRW, all CT measures targeted Muslim 
individuals, establishments, or restaurants. The critique against French authorities for ethnic 
profiling was not only voiced by affected communities but also the Council of Europe 
commissioner for human rights (Human Rights Watch 2016). There are counterproductive 
effects that fundamentally question the CT effort as a whole: On the one hand, the 
discriminate practices alienate French Muslims and undermine cooperation between the 
Muslim communities and law enforcement agencies. As such, radicalization and local 
terrorism threats are less likely to be reported to authorities. On the other hand, the state’s 
discriminatory practice widens the aforementioned gap between Muslim and non-Muslim 
groups in society. The extending polarization perpetuates the lack of cooperation and trust 
among different segments of society. Hatred and islamophobia become socially respected. 
The majority of the marginalized Muslim youth turns away from the French state and is thus 
given legitimacy for (self-)radicalization in the process. For instance, more fuel was added by 
  
 
 
Witold Mucha: Polarization, Stigmatization, Radicalization. Counterterrorism and Homeland 
Security in France and Germany 
242 
Paris’ long-debated bill proposal that would enable the government to strip French-born dual 
nationals of their French citizenship if they are convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Given 
high rates of dual nationality among French citizens of migrant background, the measure 
raised concerns that Muslim native-born French citizens were being treated as second-class 
citizens (Human Rights Watch 2016; Amnesty International 2016). 
The situation in Germany is less unambiguous regarding the causal link between polarization, 
stigmatization, and radicalization. As mentioned earlier, the number and scope auf terrorist 
attacks have been lower and no state of emergency regime has been in place. Nevertheless, 
the public and societal dynamics are similar. Regardless of the overarching refugee debate, 
there are at least two anecdotes that reveal a worrying trend that is similar to the French recent 
status quo: First, against the backdrop of the 2016 New Year’s Eve sex assaults in Cologne, 
on 2017 New Year’s Eve police and authorities have been criticized for racially profiling 
hundreds of North Africans and referring to them as “Nafris” (Mortimer 2017a; Schuhmacher 
2017). Second, after Anis Amri’s terror attack in Berlin, the former Social Democrats leader 
and German Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel called for tougher measures against Islamist 
trends in Germany. Most worrisome was his undifferentiated call for banning Islamist 
mosques (Mortimer 2017b; Deutsche Welle 2017). What is most revealing about these two 
seemingly unrelated issues is the fact that there was no public outcry or noteworthy critique 
by oppositional groups among the media, civil society, or politics. Indeed, the police was 
complimented on their proceeding at New Year’s Eve in contrast to the year before (i.e. 
number of personnel, overcautious intervention), Gabriel’s controversial proposal was mostly 
met with consent. 
Regardless of the anecdotal nature of these incidents, the commonalities with the French case 
are striking. Apparently, one-time racial profiling of people of North African descent is 
legitimated as less evil than the lack of public control and sex assaults as seen during 2016 
New Year’s Eve. However, it is likely that the public consent with the handling of 2017 New 
Year’s Eve is not an exception of a general police approach. What if it is a moment where the 
threshold towards public’s tacit consent of general racial profiling has been crossed? This 
might lead to the aforementioned vicious circle of radicalization by stigmatization: People 
with North African and/or Muslim background feel alienated by the German state, while the 
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non-Muslim community approves of the authorities’ discriminatory actions. Gabriel’s 
statement holds similar implications. In an interview with Der Spiegel, he said that “Salafist 
mosques must be banned, communities dissolved, and the preachers should be expelled as 
soon as possible. (…) Those who encourage violence do not enjoy the protection of religious 
freedom. (…) If we are serious about the fight against Islamism and terrorism, then it must 
also be a cultural fight (Gabriel in Deutsche Welle 2017).” By labelling the fight against 
Salafism a cultural fight he prepares the ground for thinking in groups and segments (i.e. 
polarization). Certainly, he assures readers that his proposals have got nothing to do with 
religious affiliation. However, how is religion to be left out when he is calling for the banning 
of Salafist mosques or the expelling of preachers? Such a proposal would effectively deny 
extremist religious interpretations the right to the freedom of religion and faith (Geyer 2017). 
Willingly or not, Gabriel’s undifferentiated call for a cultural fight feels more as cheap or 
naïve propaganda in the 2017 election year rather than an elaborate strategy to drying-out 
breeding grounds of Islamist radicalization. 
Policy recommendations 
In the aftermath of terrorist attacks in France and Germany, parliamentary commissions were 
established to investigate why the attacks had not been prevented and what kind of CT lessons 
were to be learnt. Most critique was directed against the lack of interagency trust and 
cooperation – both on horizontal (i.e. local/national) and vertical level (i.e. 
European/international). In France, a total overhaul of the intelligence services and the 
creation of a single, US-style national counter-terrorism agency were recommended (Vinocur 
2016; Breeden 2016). While the discussion in Germany went into the same direction, 
particularly after the experiences with the National Socialist Underground (NSU), the call for 
a centralization of intelligence agencies sparked substantial resistance by the federal states 
(Eddy 2017). There is no doubt that an enhanced interagency cooperation within and beyond 
national borders is a crucial CT pillar. However, this kind of policy reform allows for 
improving operative measures only. States might be better able to apprehend and deter 
terrorist activities on a short-term basis – just as more CCTV or related measures might help 
to make airports a safer place. Nevertheless, these operative responses do not properly get to 
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the origin of why terrorists would take up arms against the state in the first place. In fact, 
operative CT measures do not get to the root causes of terrorism. Against this backdrop, 
Schneckener (2006) argues in favor of a balance between operative and structural CT policies. 
Structural measures are understood as policies that tackle the breeding ground of radicalism 
and terrorism. They range from macro-policies such as statebuilding and development 
programs to micro-policies such as de-radicalization initiatives on local ground (Schneckener 
2006, 215). The latter perspective is what this paper will address in particular. 
1. Increase the number of prison imams and improve their training and formal status. 
After the Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks in 2015, Paris launched two initiatives in an 
effort to better control and counter radicalization among the prison population: radicalized 
inmates will be isolated from common criminals and the number of prison imams will be 
increased (Hellmuth 2015, 989). Apparently, two of the three January 2015 terrorists 
(Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly) had spent time in prison (Callimachi and Yardley 
2015). In Germany, legislation has not come that far yet while the need for more prison 
imams has become a broad consensus. Still, that kind of reform does not come without 
challenges. First, the selected imams need to be qualified, they need to be cosmopolitan 
enough to understand and manage social media, and they also have to be moderate, 
willing, and capable of engaging in political debates. Second, prison imams do not hold an 
official and professional status similar to that which exists for hospital and military 
chaplains. Prison imams do not receive a pension or social security and they are merely 
reimbursed for travel expenses (Hellmuth 2015, 991). Improving their status and, thus, 
legitimacy would certainly mitigate the aforementioned polarization. Therefore, while 
their numerical increase into a comprehensive CT effort is paramount, the financial 
implications for a state such as Germany or France pose a challenge. 
2. Increase the number and budget of community-based de-radicalization programs. 
The traditional response of French authorities to terrorist threats was to rely on classical 
security measures or even repression. While the prison reforms show Paris’ willingness to 
make use of a more comprehensive CT approach, community-based de-radicalization 
programs yet constitute another toolkit of structural terrorism prevention that have been 
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largely neglected by French authorities in the past (Hellmuth 2015, 988). This is different 
to Germany where there has been a longer tradition of countering (right-wing) extremism 
(Koehler 2013, 2015a). While the majority of programs worked as opt-out schemes, with 
the growing Salafist threat policymakers have begun to also fund programs that focus on 
the early phase of Salafist radicalization. For instance, in Germany the “Wegweiser”-
initiative has been praised for its prevention and de-radicalization efforts. Basically, those 
initiatives work as collaborating networks based on families, schools, mosques, public 
authorities, the police and others (Shavit and Andresen 2016). Making mosques and local 
Muslim authorities part of the network is crucial. At best, they become mediators who are 
increasingly aware of the dangers of radicalization and more proactive in preventing the 
emergence of extremism and terrorism. Whatever is done, the implementation is crucial. 
The major critique against the recent CVE-measures in France has been that the programs 
had been designed hastily without proper due diligence. In other words, opening up 
community centers in marginalized French suburbs will not yield de-radicalization results 
if the personnel is not qualified and funded in an appropriate manner. 
3. Provide law enforcement authorities with better training and additional resources 
(i.e. funding, manpower, expertise). This will make them more specific in their targeting. 
Particularly the French personnel would benefit from additional resources to ensure that 
policies are effective yet do not restrict the rights of the general public. The same holds 
true for CCTV or, more generally, data preservation that has been stressed in the German 
public debate. For instance, it is usually proposed that no more than two screens should be 
simultaneously watched per control room employee (Stutzer and Zehnder 2013, 9). What 
is the use of additional footage if there is no police officer to analyze it? Hence, the belief 
in technological answers for terrorism and the call for broader surveillance need to go 
hand in hand with more personnel. 
4. Depolarize the public debate. Salafists as well as right-wing populists benefit from 
Manichean thinking. In particular, the public commingling of the terrorism debate with 
the refugee debate has facilitated populists to construct Islamic threats. This stigmatization 
has probably alienated Muslims who previously did not bear a grudge against the state 
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and/or the system. As such, recruitment or at least sympathy for radical concepts has been 
facilitated. Policymakers have to take away the oxygen of extremist narratives on both 
ends (i.e. Salafists and right-wing populists). In light of the upcoming elections in France 
and Germany, the best way to do so would be the shift of political issues. Policymakers 
need to switch from the refugee and terrorism debate to issues such as labor, tax, and/or 
pension reforms. Compared to the disproportional media focus on terrorism, these are the 
issues that really affect people’s every day’s lives. Such a thematic shift will mitigate the 
constructed rift between the West and the Islam and turn it into a rift defined by socio-
economic grievances rather than religious affiliation. Interestingly, the separation of 
religion as a contested issue is very much in line with the CVE-approach of the 
“Wegweiser”-program. According to the employees, religion is not dealt with in 
conversations with endangered youth. Rather the focus of such a youth work approach is 
on the question of perspectives such as school or jobs (Ministerium für Inneres und 
Kommunales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 2015, 2). At the end of the day, seeking 
(socio-economic) opportunities in life seems to be the intrinsic issue under the surface of 
the polarized anti-Islam public debate. The social question reminds of the 2005 riots in 
Paris and suburbs that had been labelled by then minister of the interior, Nicholas 
Sarkozy, as fight against “racaille” and “voyous” (Mongin 2006; Peeters 2010; Alzouma 
2011). From a CVE-perspective, the crucial question is how did people such as Kouachi, 
Coulibaly, or others experience the French state back then? Would less repressive police 
forces and a less racist acting minister of the interior have had less radicalizing effects on 
future home-grown terrorists? 
These policy recommendations are not a universal answer to terrorist threats homeland 
security architects have to deal with. For instance, integrating more imams at prisons in 
France and Germany will not stop people from radicalizing. Specifically so as the majority of 
inmates are radicalized before serving a sentence (Hellmuth 2015, 991). These policy 
recommendations point to certain gaps state authorities need to better take care of from a 
comprehensive CT perspective. However, the major obstacle from the state’s point of view is 
that such a comprehensive approach is expensive. The effectiveness of surveillance 
techniques and states of emergency depend on the personnel strength as well as the training of 
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police and intelligence officers, not on the number of cameras installed or the scope of 
emergency powers. 
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